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this country in early 2006 revealed rising «health care costs» to be the most worrisome topic for Swiss households (cf. NZZ, 2006) .
<Insert Figure 1 
around here>
In view of this large public concern, it is unfortunate how little we know about the factors that drive the rapid rise in HCE. Back in 1994 , HOFFMEYER/MCCARTHY (1994 wrote that "there is just one, very clear, very well-established statistical fact relating to health care expenditure: its correlation with GDP. No other robust and stable correlations have yet been found." This statement is confirmed by ROBERTS (1999) who dates the starting point of cross-country research into the determinants of HCE back to NEWHOUSE (1977) and then writes: "During this time [the past 20 years] there has been little progress beyond the finding that variations in per capita national income are closely correlated with variations in per capita health spending" (ROBERTS, 1999: 459) .
In the literature this judgment is based on we can distinguish two stages. Between the mid-seventies and the mid-nineties, scholars such as KLEIMAN (1974) , NEWHOUSE (1977, 1987) , CULLIS/ WEST (1979) , LEU (1986) , PARKIN , CULYER (1990) , MILNE/MOLANA (1991) , GETZEN/POULLIER (1991) , GERDTHAM/JÖNSSON (1991a , 1991b , GERDTHAM , and HITIRIS/ POSNETT (1992) provided evidence for a positive correlation between HCE and GDP (mostly) in OECD data. This correlation was found to be robust to varying years covered, estimators and use of conversion factors (such as deflators, exchange rates, or health care purchasing power parities). Other intuitively plausible explanatory variables were normally not found to be statistically significant. 1 An important issue in this first stage of research was the question whether health care is a 'luxury good', i.e. whether a larger than proportionate increase in income is spent on health care (cf. GETZEN 2000) .
In the more recent stage of research -which started with MURTHY/ UKPOLO (1994) and HANSEN/KING (1996) -the time series properties of the variables in question have received more attention than before. 2 Unit root and cointegration tests were performed 1 An exception is LEU (1986) who found two parameters relating to the structure of national health systems to be statistically significant explanatory variables, namely the share of public expenditure in total health spending and the presence of a centralized national health system. Later studies mostly failed to confirm these findings.
for HCE and GDP. The results of these tests have been somewhat inconclusive and not very robust to the choice of the testing methodology. HANSEN/KING (1996) , for instance, found no cointegration between HCE and GDP for all OECD countries except Iceland applying the Engle-Granger (EG) two-step method and testing the residuals from the cointegrating regression with the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test. BLOMQVIST/CARTER (1997) reversed the result using the Phillips Perron (PP) test for the second step. There is a related controversy on whether the variables are non-stationary in the first place. MCCOSKEY/SELDEN (1998) reject the null hypothesis of unit roots for HCE and GDP while ROBERTS (1999) finds both variables to be non-stationary. Based on country-by-country as well as panel cointegration tests, GERDTHAM/LÖTHGREN (2000) confirm that both health expenditure and GDP have a unit root and that they are cointegrated. Yet, as the latest twist in this debate come the contributions by JEWELL ET AL. (2003) and CARRION-I-SILVESTRE (2005) who, for the first time in this body of literature, consider the possibility of structural breaks in the time series. Using data from 20 OECD countries, they find both HCE and GDP to be stationary around one or two structural breaks.
Reviewing the literature, we cannot help but admit that despite intense research efforts, we don't really know the degree of integration of health expenditure variables. This is unfortunate, since the issue of whether HCE is stationary or not has important consequences for modeling it. If it is integrated of order one (I(1)) -and if GDP is in fact cointegrated with it -then the preferred modeling strategy would be to set up an error-correction model (cf. FREEMAN, 2003 , HERWARTZ/THEILEN, 2003 . 3 If, on the other hand, HCE and GDP are stationary variables, then an error-correction model doesn't make much sense, since there cannot be long-run cointegrating relationships between stationary variables. Unfortunately, given that the available time series are rather short, which lowers the power of the tests, and that the number of competing tests is huge (and growing), some uncertainty is likely to remain with respect to the properties of the time series analyzed in this field of research. Of course, uncertainty about the degree of integration of health expenditure and GDP impairs attempts to appropriately model any theorized connection between them.
A new approach might be attractive not only for methodological, but also for theoretical reasons. Over the past 30 years, research into the determinants of health 3 ROBERTS (1999) prefers an autoregressive distributed lag model transformed according to the suggestions by WICKENS/BREUSCH (1988) . care expenditure has concentrated on -and to some degree even confined itself toevaluating the connection between national health expenditure and GDP. As already mentioned, attempts to detect other explanatory variables -or explanatory variables proper, since a correlation between health care expenditure and GDP does not explain much in terms of causal relations, unless one adopts a crude version of Keynesianismhave been sporadic and largely unsuccessful. 4 Not even such obvious candidates as population shares above certain age thresholds (e.g., 65 years or 75 years) have been found to contribute to the explanation of health care expenditure -except in a few studies, e.g., HITIRIS/POSNETT (1992), DI MATTEO/DI MATTEO (1998) , OKUNADE .
ZWEIFEL show that 'proximity to death' rather than ageing drives health care expenditure. Evidently, this variable is contemporaneously unknown and hence inoperative for models intending to forecast HCE. 5 "Economists have not developed a formal theory to explain or to predict the per capita medical care expenditure of a nation", concludes WILSON (1999: 160) . He continues: "In the absence of a theory, empirical work in this field has necessarily been based on ad-hoc reasoning and data availability" (ibid.).
Of course, Wilson's claim could be disputed on the grounds that GROSSMAN (1972) has introduced a micro-founded model of the demand for health. But the Grossman model is concerned with the individual's demand for health, while Wilson bemoans the absence of a theory that would explain aggregate medical care expenditure. To reduce the Grossman model to a form that can be tested empirically with aggregate data has turned out to be cumbersome since important explanatory variables (e.g. environmental quality) are unobservable (cf. WAGSTAFF, 1986 , ERBSLAND ET AL., 1998 , NOCERA/ZWEIFEL, 1998 . After all, both ROBERTS (1999) and GERDTHAM/JÖNSSON (2000) call for strengthening the theoretical basis for the macroeconomic analysis of health expenditure. According to ROBERTS (1999: 470) , this must be the "primary aim for future work".
We here intend to meet this demand, revisiting BAUMOL's (1967) theory of unbalanced growth. Baumol develops a simple neoclassical growth model that allows for explicit predictions of the future course of health expenditure. These predictions can be tested empirically. As far as we see, Baumol's model has so far escaped the attention of health economists. 6 The next section introduces the model; and section 3 proposes and performs empirical tests of its main implications.
Baumol's model of unbalanced growth
It is a hallmark of the work of William J. Baumol that it is concerned with recasting neoclassical models in a more 'realistic' form (cf. ELIASSON/HENREKSON, 2004) . Baumol's (1967) American Economic Review paper 'Macroeconomics of unbalanced growth: the anatomy of urban crisis' is no exception in this respect. In this paper, Baumol divides the economy into two parts: a 'progressive' and a 'non-progressive' sector. He then makes several assumptions, only one of which he claims to be really essential. This essential assumption states that regular growth in labor productivity can occur only in the 'progressive' sector.
For Baumol, regular productivity growth is the result of technological innovation which manifests itself in new capital goods. Capital goods are also the source of economies of scale, being another source of productivity growth. Regular productivity growth is thus defined to depend on certain physico-technological requirements which exist, as can easily be seen, in manufacturing only. In the service industries, physical capital cannot be employed on a large scale. Baumol cites repeatedly education andmost important for our subject-matter -health care as examples for industries that will inevitably remain highly labor-intensive. Such industries he relegates to the 'nonprogressive' sector. "The bulk of our municipal expenditures", Baumol writes, "is devoted to education which … offers very limited scope for cumulative increases in productivity. The same is true of police, of hospitals, of social services, and of a variety of inspection services. Despite the use of the computer in medicine …, there is no substitute for the personal attention of a physician …" (BAUMOL, 1967: 423) . Baumol does not claim that increases in labor productivity are impossible in the 'non-progressive' sector, only that this sector comprises "activities which, by their very nature, permit only sporadic increases in productivity" (BAUMOL, 1967: 416) . For simplicity, he abstracts from such sporadic productivity increases over the course of his argument.
Another simplifying -but non-essential -assumption is that labor is the only factor of production. BAUMOL (1967: 417) admits, that this assumption is "patently unrealistic".
Still, it can be seen as a consequence of his basic assumption since the 'nonprogressive' sector uses no capital in the simplest version of the model. The employment of capital in the 'progressive' sector Baumol captures -at least over timeby postulating that labor productivity in this sector grows at an exogenous rate.
Next, Baumol assumes, although, of course, not in these words, that nominal wages in both sectors are cointegrated. He simplifies further and assumes subsequently that they are equal. His final assumption is that nominal wages (in both sectors) rise to the same extent as labor productivity in the 'progressive' sector. This implies that the price level in the 'progressive' sector stays constant, whereas it rises in the 'non-progressive' sector in order to keep the level of real wages in line with the productivity level. The workers, regardless in which sector they work, buy goods and services from both sectors so that their respective real wages converge.
Equations (1) and (2) describe the production functions of the two sectors. Labor productivity in the 'non-progressive' sector (1) stays constant, whereas it grows in the 'progressive' sector (2) at the constant rate r. Thus, output in the two sectors (Y 1 and Y 2 ) at time t is given by:
with L 1 and L 2 as quantities of labor employed in the two sectors and a and b as constants.
According to one of the the assumptions just mentioned, the nominal wage (in both sectors) is given by:
with W as an arbitrary starting value.
Equation (3) completes the model of 'unbalanced growth' already. This simple model has a couple of interesting implications which Baumol draws out. The consequence of prime importance for our context is that the costs per unit of output in the 'nonprogressive' sector, which are given by (4), tend towards infinity. Costs per unit of output in the 'progressive' sector, on the other hand, stay constant (cf. (5)).
Relative costs also tend towards infinity (C 1 /C 2 = be rt /a). Under 'normal' circumstancesthat is, when prices rise in proportion to costs, and when demand is price-elastic -the 'non-progressive' sector will vanish. BAUMOL (1967: 421) invokes craftsmanship, fine restaurants, and theaters as examples of establishments that have either disappeared or retreated to luxury niches as a consequence of customers' unwillingness to tolerate the price increases that would have been necessary to cover rising costs.
Yet, parts of the 'non-progressive' sector produce necessities for which the price elasticity is very low. As already mentioned, Baumol calls attention to education and health care as examples. To show what happens in these industries as a consequence of 'unbalanced growth', Baumol assumes that the relation of real output of the two sectors remains unchanged as in (6):
with K = const. If L = L 1 + L 2 is the labor force, it follows:
From (7) and (8) we learn that, over the years (t → ∞), L 1 tends towards L, and L 2 tends towards zero. So, if the real output relation of a 'progressive' and a 'non-progressive' sector is to be kept constant under conditions of 'unbalanced growth', an ever larger share of the labor force must move to the 'non-progressive' sector (or into unemployment). Because of (4) and (5), a constant relation of real output means that an ever larger share of nominal GDP will be allotted to the 'non-progressive' sector. This shift of expenditures into the 'non-progressive' sector has been termed ' Baumol's (cost) disease' (cf. BAUMOL/TOWSE, 1997).
How relevant is Baumol's model of 'unbalanced growth'? -One way of assessing its relevance is to check whether the model's assumptions and predictions have empirical grounding. This is done by HARTWIG (2005) using Swiss data. He confirms that labor productivity growth is much higher in manufacturing than in any other industry. 7
Nominal wages in manufacturing and in the tertiary sector seem to be cointegrated. terms, the output relation of the two sectors remains fairly constant. 9 Overall, the assumptions and predictions of Baumol's model seem to be well in line with reality.
What does this model tell us about the causes of rising health expenditure? -Health care is, as we have seen above, one of Baumol's prime examples for that part of the 'non-progressive' sector that produces necessities (for which the price elasticity is very low). The 'non-progressive' sector receives an ever increasing share of total expenditures because wages in the overall economy grow faster than overall labor productivity. Baumol's model states that wage increases in excess of labor productivity growth -averaged across both sectors -drive the rise in health expenditure -and that they drive it in a directly proportional manner. The next section will test this statement empirically.
Data, methods, and results
As in most other studies, we will use OECD data, to be more specific, data from the OECD Health Data 2005 CD-ROM. In addition to detailed health data, this database also contains demographic as well as economic references. As a matter of fact, we can extract all data we need to test Baumol's model from the OECD Health Database.
Contrary to most previous studies, we concentrate on the 'total current expenditure on health' -a variable that we will call HCE -, rather than on the 'total expenditure on health' as such. Total investment in medical facilities constitutes the difference between the two, but this is a magnitude Baumol's model has not much to say about.
Unfortunately, this choice -motivated by the desire to establish the best possible coherence between theory and data -results in a loss of observations since some countries do not disaggregate their 'total expenditure on health' into the two sub- Before we proceed to presenting estimation results, we must pause for a moment to stress another feature that, apart from the choice of explanatory variables, distinguishes our approach from the bulk of the literature. In almost every paper on the subject at hand, HCE and GDP are being deflated -either with the same deflator (the GDP deflator as in, e.g., GERDTHAM, 1992) , or with different deflators for HCE and GDP, respectively. Here, however, we will use nominal data. The main reason for not deflating nominal data is that we intend to test Baumol's model of unbalanced growth, which is in nominal terms. But even more generally, there seem to be no obvious reasons for deflating expenditure magnitudes in this field of research. Economists are trained to think in terms of the physical magnitudes behind the 'veil of money'. But it is not so much the rise in (real) health care consumption that stirs public concern, but the 'cost explosion', in other words the increase in nominal expenditure. Therefore, the latter should be modeled as dependent variable. 13
Also, we will not convert our data into purchasing power parities (PPPs). PPP conversion is necessary when levels of variables are compared across countries. Here, however, we will model only growth rates. Of course, we could compare growth rates of variables after PPP conversion. This would amount to weighting the components of price indexes, the OECD recommends not to convert variables into PPPs in international comparisons of growth rates. 14 We will follow that recommendation.
An important advantage of working with pooled data is that it allows for richer specifications including country and time-specific effects. These effects can be captured by introducing either country dummy variables (cross-section fixed-effects) or period dummy variables (period fixed-effects) or both. If, however, the country or period-specific effect is itself a random variable, it would be appropriate to estimate a random-effects model. The standard way of choosing between fixed and randomeffects models is to run a Hausman test. In our case -contrary to the finding of GERDTHAM (1992) -this test does not reject the null hypothesis that the random effects are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables so that the random-effects estimator is to be preferred. This probably reflects the fact, that our sample of 19 countries is drawn somewhat randomly from the group of OECD countries according to data availability.
We will present results of cross-section as well as time period random-effects estimations along with OLS estimates. (As our sample is 'unbalanced', it is not possible to estimate two-way random-effects models.)
Tables 1 and 2 summarize our estimation results. We have to consider first that the 'Baumol variable' -the difference between nominal wage and productivity growthcan be split into three separate variables, namely per-capita wage growth, real GDP growth and growth in employment. Proceeding in a general-to-specific manner, we first estimate the influence of these three variables separately in order to test whether the restriction of summing them together to one variable is legitimate. The estimation period covers the years from 1971 to 2003. Table 1 shows that the three variables are statistically different from zero with signs as expected. For all three estimations, a Wald test fails to reject the hypothesis that C(1) + C(2) -C(3) = 0 so that we can legitimately combine the three variables into one. (9) and (10) -, the multicollinearity vanishes, and the coefficient of the 'Baumol variable' reassumes a value that is not significantly different from one, according to Wald tests.
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The second robustness test concerns parameter stability, which we will test the same way as GERDTHAM (1992), i.e. by splitting the estimation period into three arbitrary subperiods, namely 1971-1981, 1982-1992, and 1993-2003 . Table 4 shows the results for models (7) and (8), allowing us to evaluate not only the robustness of (dlog(WSPE)dlog(PROD)), but also of GDP. If models (9) and (10) instead of models (7) and (8) are tested, the coefficients of (dlog(WSPE) -dlog (PROD)) are not only highly significant in all three sub-periods, but also stable. They vary between 0.99 and 1.06 for the cross-section random-effects model and between 0.96 and 1.05 for the time period random-effects model. Again, the models have the lowest explanatory power (as well as the lowest coefficient values) in the most recent decade.
<Insert Table 4 
Finally, we test parameter stability by dropping each of the 19 countries in turn and reestimating models (7) and (8). Table 5 shows results for model (7) Unfortunately, the answer must be: not much. Baumol's analysis reveals a fundamental supply-side factor to be the main driver behind health expenditure, namely the fact that regular (as opposed to sporadic) growth in labor productivity can occur only in sectors that employ capital goods (machines). Technological progress manifests itself in capital goods, which are also the source of economies of scale. In most of the service industries, and especially in health care, there is little leeway for increasing productivity by substituting capital goods for human labor. Health policy cannot change the basic production techniques in the supply of health care.
Baumol, on his part, is unambiguous in this respect. The rise in the share of health care expenditure in nominal GDP he calls "a trend for which no man and no group should be blamed, for there is nothing that can be done to stop it" (BAUMOL, 1967: 423) .
Elsewhere (1967: 415), he declares: "(E)fforts to offset these cost increases, while they may succeed temporarily, in the long run are merely palliatives which can have no significant effect on the underlying trends." And even twenty-five years later, he remains convinced that health care is "an industry whose costs are driven by technological imperatives to rapid rise" (BAUMOL, 1993: 27) .
This said, it is clear that the best 'palliative' against the continuous rise in health care expenditure is to increase productivity in the health sector. The assumption of a zero productivity growth rate in the 'non-progressive' sector is clearly unwarranted.
Productivity can be increased in this sector also, either by employing capital goods (to the extent possible) or by an improved organization. If productivity grows, the rise in the share of health care expenditure in nominal GDP slows down. It has to be stressed, though, that as long as the productivity growth rate in the 'non-progressive' sector remains below the respective rate in the 'progressive' sector -which must be the case if
Baumol's argument about the physico-technological determinants of productivity growth is correct -, the 'health care cost explosion' can only be protracted, but not stopped or even reversed.
Conclusion
In (2003), as well as the two Fisher-type tests (MADDALA/WU, 1999 and CHOI, 2001) , allow the latter to vary freely across cross-sections. 
where π i denotes the p-value from any individual unit root test for cross-section i.
MADDALA/WU (1999) Hadri test, however, points to unit roots in the data for all three variables.
It has been pointed out before that certainty is unlikely to be gained from unit root tests. We will take the respective growth rates to be stationary, which is in line with the result of most of the tests. 1971-1981 1982-1992 1993-2003 1971-1981 1982-1992 1993-2003 (dlog(WSPE)dlog (PROD)) The values shown in parenthesis are t-ratios, based on White's robust S.E.s. The Swamy-Arora GLS estimator was used to estimate the random effects models, and weighted diagnostic statistics are reported. An asterisk denotes significance at the 1% level. Estimates for constant terms not shown.
